Compared with state-owned hotels of government reception, the hotels owned by giant state-owned enterprises have already competed with other hotels in the market. Their transformation focuses more on competition and cooperation in the operational course.

  The Transformation Tactics of Hotels Owned by Central Enterprises

From a historical perspective, the giant state-owned enterprises in possession of a series of these hotels are basically affiliated to the Central Government or the Ministries and Commissions of the State Council. That is to say they are under the leadership of “horizontal system” in the planned economic system. Their main characteristics include that they have a huge stock of assets, a large number of enterprises and a national market layout has been formed; they are suffering a small business proportion against the whole industry, low professional level and low efficiency in operation. At present, with deepening and widening of the market course oriented towards competition, the property right and the dominion over these hotels have already started to become pluralism and there may be two directions in the future development. On the one hand, in the precondition of independent property right and relying on industrial identification and on non-market relations in terms of administration, business and personnel, the hotels will ally strategically, and will decide whether to take measures in the transactions of property right. On the other hand, they can negotiate with hotel groups or hotel management companies both home and abroad, and reform in transaction of property right and management. 

  Transaction in Property and Management

The principles in this transformational strategy are “integrating regional hotels and managing by classifications; cultivating brand image and increasing the asset value and selling by classifications and regrouping the enterprises”. Take the state-owned hotel assets owned by four major state-owned commercial banks as an example. At the present stage, they are increasing the state-owned assets through management; then with the maturation of capital market, trading objects will be introduced to make a multiple property right with negotiable securities. After the state-owned inventors retreat from hotel management, the capital gained through trading will eliminate the bad assets resulted from bad historical credit loans travel guilin things to do. When the platform of negotiable securities has been built up, the investment organizations of state-owned banks can decide whether to hold partly or to drop out completely. During this process, decision makers should intensify the confidence and capacity of the operators in long term through a clear development strategy, and they should also avoid low efficient operation as “rubbish retrieving”.



Both the presence and absence of relevant laws and regulations may cause market bulwarks. It is easy to distinguish the bulwarks caused by the presence of the law. For instance, Beijing promulgated the local regulations demanding all the enterprises, including hotels could not employ non-Beijing resident as operation staff, so the present enterprises and potential entries had little choice in the acquisitions of human resources and it also meant that the operating costs of the enterprises were increased, i The market bulwarks, caused by the absence of the law are also called “the syndrome of shortage of law. ” It caused a situation that the property rights of the hotels and the contract influence in the operation cannot be effectively guaranteed, so according to the latest research, China in 2020, the world bank considers that “China has to constitute the laws and rules to support the market mechanism and protect the property right” and this should be put in the first place of the Four Tasks to establish the market economy institutions in China. ® On one hand, the bulwarks caused by the absence of the law greatly baffled potential entries, especially the entry of private economy to the hotel market; on the other hand, it is disadvantageous for state-owned hotels to expand in scale by means of merger and acquisition, franchising, alliance and management contracts etc., so that it is hard to regulate the principle assets of state-owned enterprises in the hotel market effectively.

The institutional bulwarks have very obvious influence in the development course of hotel management companies and hotel groups in China. First, at present, the state- owned hotels holding the main shares in the market have various relations to the government. Although in 1999, the enterprises used to be controlled by some government departments were separated from the departments as the armed forces and the departments of the Public Security, the People’s Procurator and the People’s Court; it would take a long time for the state-owned hotels to transfer into the market competitive bodies because the implementation of polices is time-consuming as well as the complexity of the interpersonal relationship. Pekinciudad prohibida, viajes beijing Because of this subtle relation with the government, the state- owned hotels striving for survival become the “reining” land for some government officers, and in the viewpoint of the property right economy. They are the deputies of the hotel owners with collective ownership. No matter whether the hotels are operated well, as long as they have the power on human resources or power on some rare production factors, they are able to “seek tenant” continuously. In this situation, these deputies of hotels owners would resist the hotel management companies. In addition, the pressure from the groups

 



When the administration forces are promoting state-owned hotel transformations with limited gained benefits with the marginal curves, it is one of the institutional innovations to introduce capital market, especially the capital operating manners such as sale, merger and acquisition, regroup, and shareholdings to expand the ranges of the transformation objects and increase the efficiencies. However, in the course of the actual operation, the deputies, the actual controller and the decision makers, who have the double roles or positions of both the hotel high managers and the government officers, are likely to face the condemnations of the loss of the state-owned assets as well as the risks of their political benefits. As a result, they are more likely to act in a worldly way to keep safe. In the other words, they will reflect multiple goals and behaviors in their value ideology as narrated in Chapter Four. Essentially, they are officers with the thought of corporate governance, but the official-centered concept still restricted their behaviors and their way of making decision, so it is rather hard for them to assume the political risks in the disposal of the transformation and property right of the state-owned hotels.

If they do not sell out the hotels, the assets will still keep their original value even though these hotels are in debt and the present leaders do not have to assume any responsibilities. Once they decide to sell out these assets, most state-owned hotels would be sold out at a price lower than the recorded value of the state-owned assets in capital market. Therefore, in the second situation, someone needs to turn his /her hand to the responsibility of the state-owned asset loss. Additionally, the officers with corporate governance have their terms of office Gastronomia en el sur de china. For example, some general managers of the state- owned hotels always joked that the general manager is appointed, they can leave easily. In fact, the general managers are only responsible for the product operations but not for the capital management. As a result, nobody is willing to assume the non-market risks, which means that “everybody knows how to do it but nobody does it.”

 



It should be pointed out that the corporate reform was formed completely under the leadership of local government, so it took clear characteristics of administrative backgrounds in the aspects of management system, employing mechanism and development strategy etc. For instance, Jiangsu Zhongshan Hotel Group Co., Ltd. was affiliated to the Provincial People’s Government and was a corporate institution with all systems equal to government institutions. All the administrative managers of the Party and management were still appointed by the Provincial Government and supervised by the Provincial Personnel Department. In this background, Wu Jianyi, the board 

chairman of Zhongshan Hotel Group Co., Ltd. put forward the slogan and goal of the group “the group was still an important window for the reception of Provincial Committee and Government, and it would provide better service to Provincial Committee and Government ” which was not a single political slogan but a real indication of the governmental background of the group.

   Market Development Efforts by State-Owned Hotel Groups

Some state-owned hotel groups founded through administrative power are making great efforts to promote their market development, including asset securitization, ownership reconstruction, and opening of management. Dalian Bohai Hotel ( Group) Co., Ltd. is a typical case.

In October, 1978, Bohai Hotel Dalian was opened to the public. With the total investment of 6,000,000 Yuan, the hotel was ever the most remarkable hotel in Dalian as the state-owned hotel. After ten years’ of development, Chuang Tang began to lead Bohai Hotel Dalian to expand in capital market. In 1988, Bohai Grand Hotel Dalian was established by the funds self-raised by the hotel and was opened in February 1990.

In February 1991, Dalian Municipal People’s Government approved to set up Dalian Bohai Hotel Group. In March 1992, the hotel group merged Dalian Catering Industry Group in order to meet the requirements of reform and opening-up. In March 1993, Bohai Hotel Group carried out the shareholding reform and was regrouped as the limited liability company by the way of raising funds from targeted sources. Since then, the hotel group had realized the goal of “ creating another Bohai Hotel Group ” ahead of time after four years’ efforts. During this period, the State Bureau of Internal Trade, Liaoning Provincial People’s Government and agencia futbol en Dalian Municipal People’s Government took the action of raising funds to deal with the rated money to be listed, so that five corporations with Bohai Hotel Dalian as the core became the listed company. In October 1996, the hotel group put its name plate in Shenzhen Stock Exchange and its shares could be transacted in the stock market. Then Bohai Group ranked as the experimental unit with modern corporate system in the province.



In fact, state-owned enterprises, particularly those enterprises with advantage in certain market suffered a lot at present mainly because of the restraint of system. They could not be recognized as worthless merely through their remnant of the fixed assets and financial loss at present. Instead, the potential value of its brand and aptitude should have been evaluated and their market for the future should have been taken into consideration. The change of state-owned enterprises into joint-equity and the transition of the whole property right keep the integrity of the property right and reserved the brand and the reputation, so it established a good foundation for the future development.

To Introduce the Legal Persons and Social Capital to Reformation and Promote the Pluralism of the Ownership Structure

It is rather difficult for some state-owned hotels which have huge amounts of principle assets, heavy finances, employing debts or which are unwilling to give up their superiority to achieve the transformation goal of withdrawal from the state-owned assets. In this background, the government and innovative entrepreneurs are trying their best to constitute some policies for their transition, including introducing legal persons and social capital to transforming the property right of state-owned hotels. Actually, it aims at opening the ownership of state-owned hotels to society to promote the modernization of management in the manner of pluralism. It is indicated by the fact that with further reform and opening up, more and more domestic capital will enter the transformation of state-owned hotels as well as some overseas capital which are both welcomed by the hotels.

      Opening of Property Right to State-owned Hotels in the Same Industry

Due to the restrictions of planned economic system in long term, a set of state- owned enterprises in China were set in a very serious situation, so the commercial banks of state-owned assets have accumulated a large amount of non-performing loan accordingly which Guía turismo de visitar el Tíbet turned into the most important hidden trouble in the development of national economy. As a result, Chinese government decided to establish Financial Asset Management Corporations to deal with the reorganizing and disposition of these non-performing assets in banks . In April, 1999, China CINDA Asset Management Corporation was founded which was the first financial asset management company in China and was endued with the experimental task in reorganizing and disposition of financial assets by the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China. It has been indicated for several years that the financial asset management company has played a rather important role in promoting the reorganization of the state-owned enterprises.



In the late 1990s, countries of Commonwealth of Independent States began to understand the importance of tourism and hotels. The development and management of hotels were decentralized. Each government had great autonomy and responsibility to develop hotels and tourism infrastructure. Each country had a big budget for the renovation and construction of hotels. In this process, the countries of CIS realized the short of capital; they wanted to attract foreign investment. The foreign investors could joint-venture or joint cooperation with local partners.

One of the important problems in the foreign joint venture or investment was the land ownership. Each CIS members would rent the land to foreigners for a long period. However, the specific laws and regulations on the land ownership had not been made. The ownership of some land and hotels were still in dispute. For example, several countries were disputing the ownership of 150 sanatoriums along the Black Sea coast. Each member of CIS was adopting two measures to reform land ownership. The first was to commercialize the land. They established land and real estate leasing companies in order to lease the land and property to others. Second: privatization. They sold the ownership of land and real estate through competitive bidding. Foreign investors were allowed to participate.

The Press Secretary for the Russian Prime Minister announced in the spring of 2002 that according to the order from Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, the government departments and state-owned enterprises were not only withdrawing their shares from the commercial hanks, also withdrawing their shares from insurance companies and investment companies. It is said that, the selling of state-owned shares would start with the banks. This would affect about 600 banks according to the preliminary estimate El Bund Shanghai huangpu. The government had expanded the practice of “privately-owned replacing the state-owned” in fields that were previously under strict government control, such as banking. We could conclude from this that there would be broader and quicker reforms for the state-owned hotels.

   The Transformation of SOHs in Hungary

In June, 1987, while Hungary was still operating under a planned economy. The country owned 791 lodging hotels (individual house renting not included) that could receive foreign tourists Tibet informacion de turismo. Among these hotels, there were 253 star-rated hotels owned by three state-owned hotel groups. The Hungary hotel groups provided service mainly for sightseeing, the Pannonia Hotel group provided service mainly for vacation or leisure tourists and the Danubius hotel group provided medical and health service for the tourists at hot springs and spas.



The problem is, in the actual management practice of SOHs, the departments in charge of the SOHs use an unchangeable system on general managers of the hotel. When the monetary payment is fixed, the general manager’s effort is not oriented to the improvement of the hotel market share in the tourism market because it does not have positive correlations to their economic benefits. In our investigation and study, we find that some SOH general managers felt that they were facing a paradox. If they operate the hotel well, for example, the operational indexes are 5 million Yuan more than the expectation and then they cannot keep their positions because some others would like to take the place the next year for the profits. If they do not operate well, for example, there is a loss of 10 million Yuan at the end-of-year accounts. They cannot keep their positions because some officials or departments would come to check the loss of state assets. So the managers “do account” to show a 5% loss last year and a 6% profit this year as well as the expected loss of 300 thousands Yuan next year. In this way, the departments, especially the leaders in charge have the impression of the managers as “not so good and not so bad”. The result is, although the general managers have preserved their positions, the state-owned hotels become the mutual “rent-seeking” stages for the officials of departments in charge of the hotels and hotel managers.

The Incentive—Constraint Mechanism under the Dual Targets

Under the restriction of dual targets, it is more difficult for SOHs to establish an effective incentive-constraint mechanism.

Firstly, under the restriction of dual targets, it is more difficult for SOHs to clarify and institutionalize the incentive-constraint mechanism because the clarification and institutionalization of the incentive-constraint mechanism require the responsibilities and interests of the agents be measured by money and restricted by contracts guia hispana de lhasa. Only in the monetary system the revenue can be measured and compared accurately and can get a clear objective function in agent’s mind. Without the considerations of influences of outside uncertainties such as the opportunities; a monotonous and continuous objective function can make the managers work hard to get the higher monetary benefits. In the entrust—agency relationship of the state-owned reception hotels, only R, (W) can be measured by money, while the administrative revenue R2 (8) agencia de turismo en china cannot be accurately measured by money, so the government officials or departments in charge of the hotel cannot technically establish an incentive—constraint system that can be calculated for the hotel managers.



Secondly, under the restriction of dual targets, it is hard to establish the professional manager groups in tourism and accommodation market as in foreign development countries. In market economy, the owner of hotel enterprise oriented purely toward the economic profits can determine the salary of its human resources according to their revenues and profits. But for SOHs, the value of general managers cannot be judged only by the profit index. Besides, there are requirements for ideology and security in hotel reception and the mobility of management staff including the general managers are weak. Therefore, under the condition that the professional manager market is hard to be established, it is inevitable that the managers of SOHs become bureaucracy. At present, the general managers of the Chinese government official reception hotels are more government officials than entrepreneurs or professional managers. Plenty of the general managers of the SOHs also have the corresponding administrative official levels and in some hotels, general managers are just the officials such as directors of the reception office. In this institutional framework, the low efficiency of SOHs operation performance is actually the low efficiency in administration. In addition, there are countless man-made factors. All add up to soften the government budget restriction for SOHs. When the major reception objects or the major leader of the government are absent, some general manager of SOHs would issue order in their own hotels with dual identities both as the owners and the professional managers. They enjoy more resource allocation and production disposal rights than the chairman of the board or general managers. What’s more, when the general managers of the SOHs find that the punishment is smaller than the benefits they get when they get out of lines or exceed their authorities, they would like to increase the agent revenue through operational behaviors which would cause the lower efficiency of the SOHs and larger loss of state- owned assets.

Thirdly, from the inside management system, it is difficult to solve the problems of establishing a basic platform for the scientific management and operation of hotels because the general managers of SOHs also have the corresponding official ranks Tibet plaza de turismo, or they are government officials. To view from the history and the present conditions, the standardization and institutionalization of the hotel management are more effective in the basic service level and in basic management level, and the effectiveness is progressively weakening when it comes to the higher management levels. There are management reasons that it is harder to accurately measure the work of high-level managers, and reasons of the conservation and rejection from the vested interest groups, but the underlying reason is the traditional opinion that “the law does not apply to high managers”  morada de los dioses lhasa. The managers think that as the general manager of the hotel, he should not be restrained by the regulations and rules like ordinary employees. This underlying reason is the biggest micro obstacle factor for SOHs to establish a modern enterprise operation system.